期刊
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
卷 99, 期 -, 页码 24-34出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.01.001
关键词
Environmental regulation; Monitoring and enforcement; EPA; Natural field experiment; Random assignment
类别
Relying on a small natural field experiment conducted by the Norwegian Environmental Protection Agency, I estimate effects of three fundamental elements of most monitoring and enforcement practices: self-reporting, audit frequency and specific deterrence. I find evidence of under-reporting of violations in firms' self-audits, as more violations are detected in on-site audits than in self-audits. Announcing the increased audit frequency has no effect on firms' compliance, but an audit raises subsequent compliance substantially. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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