期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
卷 164, 期 1, 页码 255-261出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-0001-x
关键词
Scientific explanation; Laws of nature; Hume; Lewis; Grounding; Hempel
类别
It has often been argued that Humean accounts of natural law cannot account for the role played by laws in scientific explanations. Loewer (Philosophical Studies 2012) has offered a new reply to this argument on behalf of Humean accounts-a reply that distinguishes between grounding (which Loewer portrays as underwriting a kind of metaphysical explanation) and scientific explanation. I will argue that Loewer's reply fails because it cannot accommodate the relation between metaphysical and scientific explanation. This relation also resolves a puzzle about scientific explanation that Hempel and Oppenheim (Philosophy of Science 15:135-75, 1948) encountered.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据