4.4 Article

Boardroom centrality and firm performance

期刊

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
卷 55, 期 2-3, 页码 225-250

出版社

ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.01.006

关键词

Board of director networks; Analyst forecasts; Market efficiency

向作者/读者索取更多资源

Firms with central boards of directors earn superior risk-adjusted stock returns. A long (short) position in the most (least) central firms earns average annual returns of 4.68%. Firms with central boards also experience higher future return-on-assets growth and more positive analyst forecast errors. Return prediction, return-on-assets growth, and analyst errors are concentrated among high growth opportunity firms or firms confronting adverse circumstances, consistent with boardroom connections mattering most for firms standing to benefit most from information and resources exchanged through boardroom networks. Overall, our results suggest that director networks provide economic benefits that are not immediately reflected in stock prices. (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier B.V.

作者

我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.4
评分不足

次要评分

新颖性
-
重要性
-
科学严谨性
-
评价这篇论文

推荐

暂无数据
暂无数据