期刊
OPTIMIZATION LETTERS
卷 12, 期 7, 页码 1487-1502出版社
SPRINGER HEIDELBERG
DOI: 10.1007/s11590-018-1288-0
关键词
Cournot competition; Yield uncertainty; Capacity constraint; Influenza vaccine market
Motivated by the U.S. influenza vaccine market, we study the impact of random yield and production capacity on the number of firms, total supply, consumer surplus and social welfare in a market with identical suppliers. We formulate a two-stage game with endogenous entry, where each entering firm aims to maximize its profit under yield uncertainty subject to a production capacity constraint. We show that if firms produce full capacity in the equilibrium, then there are fewer firms in the equilibrium compared to the social optimum even for small levels of yield uncertainty. Furthermore, we prove that if firms do not produce full capacity in the equilibrium, they will not produce full capacity in the social optimum.
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