期刊
JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS
卷 43, 期 3, 页码 229-247出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-013-9215-x
关键词
Energy efficiency; Energy conservation; Incentive regulation
类别
We examine the design of regulatory policy to induce electric utilities to deliver the surplus-maximizing level of energy efficiency services, e*. The rebound effect (whereby increased energy efficiency stimulates the demand for energy) typically renders revenue decoupling insufficient in this regard. The additional financial incentive required to induce e* is shown to vary with such factors as the prevailing price of energy, the magnitude of the rebound effect, the extent of observable energy efficiency investments, and the utility's objective.
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