期刊
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
卷 111, 期 -, 页码 17-28出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012
关键词
Harassment bribes; Experiment; Asymmetric penalty; Retaliation
类别
This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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