期刊
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
卷 84, 期 -, 页码 180-195出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.002
关键词
Linear public goods game; Sanction; Punishment institutions; Laboratory experiment
类别
资金
- Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research [26245026, 23530231, 26285045] Funding Source: KAKEN
This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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