期刊
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
卷 22, 期 2, 页码 199-227出版社
ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2013.861002
关键词
Sellars; McDowell; Merleau-Ponty; phenomenology; perception; intentionality
类别
Here I show that Sellars' radicalization of the Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions is vulnerable to a challenge grounded in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of embodiment. Sellars argues that Kant's concept of intuition' is ambiguous between singular demonstrative phrases and sense-impressions. In light of the critique of the Myth of the Given, Sellars argues, in the Myth of Jones', that sense-impression are theoretical posits. I argue that Merleau-Ponty offers a way of understanding perceptual activity which successfully avoids both the Myth of the Given and the Myth of Jones. I also argue that Merleau-Ponty's approach provides an alternative to McDowell's critique of Sellars. Merleau-Ponty shows, first, that perceptual activity can be characterized as having a unity and structure of its own which is importantly different from that of concepts; secondly, that the unity and structure of perception can be revealed phenomenologically rather than as a theoretical posit.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据