期刊
JOURNAL OF SPORTS ECONOMICS
卷 15, 期 4, 页码 385-409出版社
SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC
DOI: 10.1177/1527002512461358
关键词
imperfect decision making; perfect Bayesian equilibrium; mixed strategies
Bayesian enforcement'' assumes that doping tests are imperfect. Moreover, the enforcer is interested in fostering compliant behavior and making correct decisions. Three types of perfect Bayesian equilibria exist, which differ in their punishment styles: tyrannic,'' draconian,'' and lenient.'' The equilibrium probability of compliant behavior is highest in the lenient equilibrium; therefore, the legal framework of the enforcement should aim at unselecting the draconian and tyrannic equilibria. Total deterrence is impossible as long as the signal is imperfect. An increase in punishment would not increase the probability of compliant behavior.
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