期刊
COGNITION
卷 133, 期 2, 页码 480-487出版社
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2014.07.010
关键词
Social information; All pay auction; Decision-making; Preference formation; Competition
资金
- Wellcome Trust [091593, 098362, 098362/Z/12/Z] Funding Source: Medline
Competitive interactions between individuals are ubiquitous in human societies. Auctions represent an institutionalized context for these interactions, a context where individuals frequently make non-optimal decisions. In particular, competition in auctions can lead to overbidding, resulting in the so-called winner's curse, often explained by invoking emotional arousal. In this study, we investigated an alternative possibility, namely that competitors' bids are construed as a source of information about the good's common value thereby influencing an individuals' private value estimate. We tested this hypothesis by asking participants to bid in a repeated all-pay auction game for five different real items. Crucially, participants had to rank the auction items for their preference before and after the experiment. We observed a clear relation between auction dynamics and preference change. We found that low competition reduced preference while high competition increased preference. Our findings support a view that competitors' bids in auction games are perceived as valid social signal for the common value of an item. We suggest that this influence of social information constitutes a major cause for the frequently observed deviations from optimality in auctions. (C) 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.orgilicenses/by/3.0/).
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