期刊
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION RESEARCH
卷 56, 期 24, 页码 7405-7425出版社
TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2018.1471237
关键词
assembly systems; random yield; pull contract; push contract; game theory
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [91746110, 71372019, 91746208, 71521002]
- National Science Fund of China for Distinguished Young Scholars [71625003]
- Special Items Fund of Beijing Municipal Commission of Education
This study investigates how random component yields can influence pricing and production decisions under pull and push contracts. We consider a decentralised assembly system where a manufacturer procures complementary components from two suppliers with random yields. We first characterise the centralised equilibrium decision as a benchmark and then analyse the equilibrium solutions in a decentralised assembly system under each contract. We find that neither contract is always superior to the other in terms of system profit. Under a push contract, suppliers always achieve the first mover advantage with higher payoff. However, the first mover advantage does not hold for the manufacturer under a pull contract. We further conduct sensitivity analysis to study the impact of random component yields and retail price on equilibrium solutions under each contract. Interestingly, the wholesale prices charged by suppliers always increase with supply yield uncertainty under a pull contract, but decrease under a push contract. In contrast with the centralised solution, the equilibrium quantities in the decentralised solution decrease with supply yield uncertainty under both pull and push contracts. We then extend our model to a general case with multiple suppliers. The system payoff decreases with the number of suppliers, and the main results derived in two suppliers setting still hold in the system with multiple suppliers.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据