期刊
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC
卷 43, 期 5, 页码 827-834出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s10992-013-9291-5
关键词
Paradoxes; Incompleteness; Truth; Yablo's paradox; Godel's theorem; Rosser's theorem; Self-reference; Well-foundedness
类别
In a recent paper (CieA > liAski and Urbaniak 2012), Urbaniak and CieA > liAski describe an analogue of the Yablo Paradox, in the domain of formal provability. Just as the infinite sequence of Yablo sentences inherit the paradoxical behavior of the liar sentence, an infinite sequence of sentences can be constructed that inherit the distinctive behavior of the Godel sentence. This phenomenon-the transfer of the properties of self-referential sentences of formal mathematics to their unwindings into infinite sequences of sentences-suggests a number of interesting logical questions. The purpose of this paper is to give a precise statement of a conjecture from CieA > liAski and Urbaniak (2012) regarding the unwinding of the Rosser sentence, and to demonstrate that this precise statement is false. We begin with some preliminary motivation, introduce the conjecture against the background of some related results, and finally, in the last section, move on to the proof, which adapts a method used by Solovay and Guaspari.
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