期刊
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
卷 122, 期 6, 页码 1235-1270出版社
UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
DOI: 10.1086/677254
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This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects' misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified interpretation of preference revelation. Mistakes in choices obscured by a possible error at the foundation of the theory of framing can masquerade as having been produced by nonstandard preferences.
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