期刊
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING
卷 17, 期 3, 页码 604-616出版社
IEEE COMPUTER SOC
DOI: 10.1109/TMC.2017.2732982
关键词
Crowdsourcing; incentive mechanism; multi-dimension; moral hazard; contract theory
资金
- NSF Grant from the US National Science Foundation [CNS-1717454, CNS-1731424, CNS-1702850, CNS-1646607, ECCS-1547201, CMMI-1434789, CNS-1443917, ECCS-1405121, CNS-1343361, CNS-1350230]
- Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea(NRF) - Ministry of Education [NRF-2016R1D1A1B01015320]
- Direct For Computer & Info Scie & Enginr
- Division Of Computer and Network Systems [1613661] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
- National Research Foundation of Korea [21A20131612192] Funding Source: Korea Institute of Science & Technology Information (KISTI), National Science & Technology Information Service (NTIS)
In current wireless communication systems, there is a rapid development of location based services, which will play an essential role in the future 5G networks. One key feature in providing the service is the mobile crowdsourcing in which a central cloud node denoted as the principal collects location based data from a large group of users. In this paper, we investigate the problem of how to provide continuous incentives based on user's performances to encourage users' participation in the crowdsourcing, which can be referred to the moral hazard problem in the contract theory. We not only propose the one-dimensional performance-reward related contract, but also extend this basic model into the multi-dimensional contract. First, an incentive contract which rewards users by evaluating their performances from multiple dimensions is proposed. Then, the utility maximization problem of the principal in both one-dimension and multi-dimension are formulated. Furthermore, we detailed the analysis of the multi-dimensional contract to allocate incentives. Finally, we use the numerical results to analyze the optimal reward package, and compare the principal's utility under the different incentive mechanisms. Results demonstrate that by using the proposed incentive mechanism, the principal successfully maximizes the utilities, and the users obtain continuous incentives to participate in the crowdsourcing activity.
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