期刊
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING
卷 17, 期 5, 页码 912-927出版社
IEEE COMPUTER SOC
DOI: 10.1109/TDSC.2018.2822294
关键词
Servers; Encryption; Privacy; Indexes; Public key; Searchable encryption; symmetric primitives; forward privacy; I; O efficiency
类别
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [61572294, 61632020]
- Special Fund for General Scientific Research in Shandong University [2017JC019]
- Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council of UK [EP/M013561/2]
- EPSRC [EP/M013561/2] Funding Source: UKRI
Recently, several practical attacks raised serious concerns over the security of searchable encryption. The attacks have brought emphasis on forward privacy, which is the key concept behind solutions to the adaptive leakage-exploiting attacks, and will very likely to become a must-have property of all new searchable encryption schemes. For a long time, forward privacy implies inefficiency and thus most existing searchable encryption schemes do not support it. Very recently, Bost (CCS 2016) showed that forward privacy can be obtained without inducing a large communication overhead. However, Bost's scheme is constructed with a relatively inefficient public key cryptographic primitive, and has poor I/O performance. Both of the deficiencies significantly hinder the practical efficiency of the scheme, and prevent it from scaling to large data settings. To address the problems, we first present FAST, which achieves forward privacy and the same communication efficiency as Bost's scheme, but uses only symmetric cryptographic primitives. We then present FASTIO, which retains all good properties of FAST, and further improves I/O efficiency. We implemented the two schemes and compared their performance with Bost's scheme. The experiment results show that both our schemes are highly efficient.
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