期刊
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
卷 21, 期 1, 页码 106-147出版社
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12004
关键词
Corporate governance; hedge funds; event studies; long-run performance
Recent regulatory changes in the German financial system shifted corporate control activities from universal banks to other capital market participants. Particularly hedge funds took advantage of the resulting control vacuum by acquiring stakes in weakly governed and less profitable firms. We document that, on average, hedge funds increased shareholder value in the short- and long-run. However, more aggressive hedge funds generated only initially higher returns and their outperformance quickly reversed, whereas non-aggressive hedge funds ultimately outperformed their aggressive peers. These findings suggest that aggressive hedge funds attempt to expropriate the target firm's shareholders by exiting at temporarily increased share prices.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据