期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
卷 172, 期 4, 页码 905-924出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-014-0300-5
关键词
Abduction; Empiricism; Explanation; Likelihood; Moral realism; Naturalism; Scientific realism
类别
Richard Boyd and Nicholas Sturgeon develop distinctive naturalistic arguments for scientific realism and moral realism. Each defends a realist position by an inference to the best explanation. In this paper, I suggest that these arguments for realism should be reformulated, with the law of likelihood replacing inference to the best explanation. The resulting arguments for realism do not work.
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