期刊
INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE
卷 22, 期 3, 页码 401-425出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s10797-014-9318-z
关键词
Tax evasion; Social interactions; Peer effects; Cross-country comparisons; Experiments
类别
资金
- Belgian Science Policy [SUBLEC AG/JJ/137]
- Belgium's French Community [ARC 05/10-332]
We experimentally study how receiving information about tax compliance of others affects individuals' occupational choices and subsequent evading decisions. In one treatment individuals receive information about the highest tax evasion rates of others in past experimental sessions with no such social information; in another treatment they receive information about the lowest tax evasion rates observed in the past sessions with no such social information. We observe an asymmetric effect of social information on tax compliance. Whereas examples of high compliance do not have any disciplining effect, we find evidence that examples of low compliance significantly increase tax evasion for certain audit probabilities. No major differences are found across countries.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据