期刊
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
卷 92, 期 -, 页码 41-52出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005
关键词
Repeated games; Zero-determinant strategies; Cooperation; Reciprocity; Extortion
类别
资金
- Foundational Questions in Evolutionary Biology Fund [RFP 12-21]
- Schrodinger scholarship of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) [J3475]
- Austrian Science Fund (FWF) [J3475] Funding Source: Austrian Science Fund (FWF)
- Austrian Science Fund (FWF) [J 3475] Funding Source: researchfish
Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players' payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-one or not. (C) 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.
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