期刊
BRQ-BUSINESS RESEARCH QUARTERLY
卷 18, 期 3, 页码 161-173出版社
ELSEVIER ESPANA SLU
DOI: 10.1016/j.brq.2014.07.003
关键词
Corporate governance; Institutional investors; Board of directors; Remuneration; Compensation
资金
- Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation [ECO2011-29144-C03-01, ECO2011-29144-C03-02]
We address the influence of directors who represent institutional investors in three aspects of board compensation policies: level of compensation, composition, and performance sensitivity. We differentiate pressure-sensitive directors (i.e., with business links) and pressure-resistant directors (i.e., without business links). Our results show that pressure-resistant directors decrease total board compensation and its fixed proportion, whereas they increase the variable proportion of total remuneration and the pay-for-performance sensitivity. By contrast, pressure-sensitive directors offer the opposite results. These findings are consistent with the view that institutional investors are not a homogeneous group and that pressure-resistant directors fulfill a more thorough monitoring role. (C) 2013 ACEDE. Published by Elsevier Espana, S.L.U. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license.
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