期刊
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
卷 117, 期 1, 页码 5-28出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.07.004
关键词
Executive frugality; Legal infractions; Financial reporting risk; Corporate culture
资金
- Fama-Miller Center for Research in Finance
- Accounting Research Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
- Institute for Fraud Prevention
We examine how executives' behavior outside the workplace, as measured by their ownership of luxury goods (low frugality) and prior legal infractions, is related to financial reporting risk. We predict and find that chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) with a legal record are more likely to perpetrate fraud. In contrast, we do not find a relation between executives' frugality and the propensity to perpetrate fraud. However, as predicted, we find that unfrugal CEOs oversee a relatively loose control environment characterized by relatively high and increasing probabilities of other insiders perpetrating fraud and unintentional material reporting errors during their tenure. Further, cultural changes associated with an increase in fraud risk are more likely during unfrugal (vs. frugal) CEOs' reigns, including the appointment of an unfrugal CFO, an increase in executives' equity-based incentives to misreport, and a decline in measures of board monitoring intensity. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据