期刊
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
卷 26, 期 9, 页码 1353-1367出版社
SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC
DOI: 10.1177/0956797614558717
关键词
theory of mind; automaticity; false belief; replication; open data; open materials
资金
- Stanford Psychology Department
- MIT Brian and Cognitive Sciences Department, Office of Naval Research [N00014-13-1-0287]
- Packard Foundation
In recent work, Kovacs, Teglas, and Endress (2010) argued that human adults automatically represented other agents' beliefs even when those beliefs were completely irrelevant to the task being performed. In a series of 13 experiments, we replicated these previous findings but demonstrated that the effects found arose from artifacts in the experimental paradigm. In particular, the critical findings demonstrating automatic belief computation were driven by inconsistencies in the timing of an attention check, and thus do not provide evidence for automatic theory of mind in adults.
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