4.4 Article

Knowledge Does Not Protect Against Illusory Truth

期刊

JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL
卷 144, 期 5, 页码 993-1002

出版社

AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC
DOI: 10.1037/xge0000098

关键词

illusory truth; fluency; knowledge neglect

资金

  1. James S. McDonnell Foundation
  2. National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship

向作者/读者索取更多资源

In daily life, we frequently encounter false claims in the form of consumer advertisements, political propaganda, and rumors. Repetition may be one way that insidious misconceptions, such as the belief that vitamin C prevents the common cold, enter our knowledge base. Research on the illusory truth effect demonstrates that repeated statements are easier to process, and subsequently perceived to be more truthful, than new statements. The prevailing assumption in the literature has been that knowledge constrains this effect (i.e., repeating the statement The Atlantic Ocean is the largest ocean on Earth will not make you believe it). We tested this assumption using both normed estimates of knowledge and individuals' demonstrated knowledge on a postexperimental knowledge check (Experiment 1). Contrary to prior suppositions, illusory truth effects occurred even when participants knew better. Multinomial modeling demonstrated that participants sometimes rely on fluency even if knowledge is also available to them (Experiment 2). Thus, participants demonstrated knowledge neglect, or the failure to rely on stored knowledge, in the face of fluent processing experiences.

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