期刊
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
卷 94, 期 -, 页码 57-79出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.09.002
关键词
Multi-contest tournaments; Real effort; Feedback; Team incentive; Experiment
类别
资金
- Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
We study the impact of progress feedback on players' performance in multi-contest team tournaments, in which team members' efforts are not directly substitutable. In particular, we employ a real-effort laboratory experiment to understand, in a best-of-three tournament, how players' strategic mindsets change when they compete on a team compared to when they compete individually. Our data corroborate the theoretical predictions for teams: Neither a lead nor a lag in the first component contest affects a team's performance in the subsequent contests. In individual tournaments, however, contrary to the theoretical prediction, we observe that leaders perform worse-but laggards perform better-after learning the outcome of the first contest. Our findings offer the first empirical evidence from a controlled laboratory of the impact of progress feedback between team and individual tournaments, and contribute new insights on team incentives. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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