期刊
JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE
卷 83, 期 1, 页码 181-216出版社
WILEY-BLACKWELL
DOI: 10.1111/jori.12096
关键词
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资金
- National Institutes of Health-National Institute on Aging [P30 AG12836]
- Boettner Center for Pensions and Retirement Security at the University of Pennsylvania
- National Institutes of Health-National Institute of Child Health and Development Population Research Infrastructure Program [R24 HD-044964]
We examine insurance markets with two-dimensional asymmetric information on risk type and on preferences related to regret. In contrast to Rothschild and Stiglitz (), the equilibrium can be efficient; that is, it can coincide with the equilibrium under full information. Furthermore, we show that pooling, semipooling, and separating equilibria can exist. Specifically, there exist separating equilibria that predict a positive correlation between the level of insurance coverage and risk type, as in the standard economic models of adverse selection, but there also exist separating equilibria that predict a negative correlation between the level of insurance coverage and risk type. Since optimal choice of regretful customers depends on foregone alternatives, the equilibrium includes a contract that is offered but not purchased.
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