期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
卷 173, 期 4, 页码 1031-1052出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-015-0539-5
关键词
Skepticism; Cartesian skepticism; Brain in a vat; Bayesianism
类别
Skeptical hypotheses such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis provide extremely poor explanations for our sensory experiences. Because these scenarios accommodate virtually any possible set of evidence, the probability of any given set of evidence on the skeptical scenario is near zero; hence, on Bayesian grounds, the scenario is not well supported by the evidence. By contrast, serious theories make reasonably specific predictions about the evidence and are then well supported when these predictions are satisfied.
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