期刊
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT
卷 34, 期 6, 页码 1071-1087出版社
ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijproman.2015.08.003
关键词
Capital project; Collaboration; Contract; Incentive; Relational; Teamwork; Trust
类别
How collaborative contracts and contractual incentives might influence project performance remains equivocal. We hypothesized that their effects on project performance are mediated by owner contractor collaboration, measured in terms of relational attitudes (relational norms and senior management commitment) and teamworking quality (inter-team collaborative processes). Using PLS-SEM, we analyzed a sample of 113 capital projects. The results suggest that through better relational attitudes and teamworking quality, projects with a partnering/alliance contract are likely to perform better than those with lump-sum and reimbursable contracts. Likewise, the projects with incentive contracts are likely to perform better than those without incentives through better relational attitudes and teamworking quality. There were no differences in project performance directly associated with different contract types and contractual incentives. Taken together, a partnering/alliance contract and incentive contracts do not necessarily result directly into better project performance but through relational attitudes and how they play out into actual teamworking behavior. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据