期刊
PHYSICAL REVIEW A
卷 94, 期 2, 页码 -出版社
AMER PHYSICAL SOC
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.94.022328
关键词
-
资金
- UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) [EP/M013472/1]
- EPSRC CM-CDT [EP/L015110/1]
- Galician Regional Government [EM2014/033]
- Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO)
- Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER) [TEC2014-54898-R]
- EPSRC [EP/M013472/1, EP/K022717/1] Funding Source: UKRI
- Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council [EP/K022717/1, EP/M013472/1, 1512855] Funding Source: researchfish
Digital signatures play an important role in software distribution, modern communication, and financial transactions, where it is important to detect forgery and tampering. Signatures are a cryptographic technique for validating the authenticity and integrity of messages, software, or digital documents. The security of currently used classical schemes relies on computational assumptions. Quantum digital signatures (QDS), on the other hand, provide information-theoretic security based on the laws of quantum physics. Recent work on QDS Amiri et al., Phys. Rev. A 93, 032325 (2016); Yin, Fu, and Zeng-Bing, Phys. Rev. A 93, 032316 (2016) shows that such schemes do not require trusted quantum channels and are unconditionally secure against general coherent attacks. However, in practical QDS, just as in quantum key distribution (QKD), the detectors can be subjected to side-channel attacks, which can make the actual implementations insecure. Motivated by the idea of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), we present a measurement-device-independent QDS (MDI-QDS) scheme, which is secure against all detector side-channel attacks. Based on the rapid development of practical MDI-QKD, our MDI-QDS protocol could also be experimentally implemented, since it requires a similar experimental setup.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据