期刊
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
卷 83, 期 4, 页码 1741-1778出版社
OXFORD UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdv054
关键词
Dynamic game; strategic interaction; structural estimation; International environmental agreement; preferential trade agreement; bilateral investment treaty; international relations
类别
资金
- ERP Fellowship from German National Academic Foundation
- Fisher Dissertation Fellowship from Resources for the Future
- Georg Walter Leitner Grant in International and Comparative Political Economy from Yale University
- Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation [SEJ2007-62908]
- Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness [ECO2012-31358, RYC-2013-12492]
- Economic and Social Research Council [ES/M010341/1] Funding Source: researchfish
- ESRC [ES/M010341/1] Funding Source: UKRI
This article develops an empirical framework for analysing the timing of international treaties. A treaty is modelled as a dynamic game among governments that decide on participation in every period. The net benefit of treaty membership increases over time. Spillovers among members and non-members accelerate or delay treaty formation by transforming participation into a strategic complement or substitute, respectively. The predictions of the model inform the estimation of the structural parameters, based on a cross section of treaty ratification dates. With this approach, I estimate the sign and magnitude of strategic interaction in the ratification of the Montreal Protocol, in the formation of Europe's preferential trade agreements, and in the growth of Germany's network of bilateral investment treaties. Through a series of counterfactual experiments, I explore different mechanisms that give rise to strategic interaction in the formation of these treaties.
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