期刊
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
卷 64, 期 -, 页码 12-19出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2015.01.006
关键词
Bank runs; Coordination game; Observability of actions; Cognitive abilities; Strategic uncertainty
类别
资金
- Spanish Ministry of Education [ECO2011-25349, ECO2011-29230, ECO2010-19830]
- Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA) [PD 105934]
We assess the effect of cognitive abilities on withdrawal decisions in a bank-run game. In our setup, depositors choose sequentially between withdrawing or keeping their funds deposited in a common bank. Depositors may observe previous decisions depending on the information structure. Theoretically, the last depositor in the sequence of decisions has a dominant strategy and should always keep the funds deposited, regardless of what she observes (if anything). Recognizing the dominant strategy, however, is not always straightforward. If there exists strategic uncertainty (e.g., if the last depositor has no information regarding the decisions of predecessors), then the identification of the dominant strategy is more difficult than in a situation with no strategic uncertainty (e.g., the last depositor is informed about all previous decisions). We find that cognitive abilities, as measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), predict withdrawals in the presence of strategic uncertainty (participants with stronger abilities tend to identify the dominant strategy more easily) but that the CRT does not predict behavior when strategic uncertainty is absent. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据