4.3 Article

Nudging farmers to enrol land into agri-environmental schemes: the role of a collective bonus

期刊

EUROPEAN REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
卷 43, 期 4, 页码 609-636

出版社

OXFORD UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1093/erae/jbv031

关键词

payment for environmental services; choice experiment; collective incentive; social norm; behavioural economics

资金

  1. ONEMA

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This article shows that the introduction of a conditional collective bonus in an agri-environmental scheme (AES) can improve farmers' participation and increase land enrolment for lower overall budgetary costs. This monetary bonus is paid in addition to the usual AES payment if a given threshold is reached in terms of aggregate farmer participation. Using a choice experiment, we estimate the preferences of winegrowers in the South of France for such a bonus. We show that it contributes to increased expectations of farmers on others' participation, therefore shifting a pro-environmental social norm and favouring the adoption of less pesticide-intensive farming practices.

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