期刊
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID
卷 8, 期 4, 页码 1790-1801出版社
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TSG.2015.2508443
关键词
Smart grid; cake cutting game; shared facility; discriminate pricing; social optimality; Pareto optimality
资金
- Singapore University of Technology and Design through the Energy Innovation Research Program Singapore [NRF2012EWT-EIRP002-045]
- U.S. National Science Foundation [ECCS-1549881]
- National ICT Australia
- Australian Government through the Department of Communications
- Australian Research Council through the Information and Communications Technology Centre of Excellence Program
Pricing schemes are an important smart grid feature to affect typical energy usage behavior of energy users (EUs). However, most existing schemes use the assumption that a buyer pays the same price per unit of energy to all suppliers at any particular time when energy is bought. By contrast, here a discriminate pricing technique using game theory is studied. A cake cutting game is investigated, in which participating EUs in a smart community decide on the price per unit of energy to charge a shared facility controller (SFC) in order to sell surplus energy. The focus is to study fairness criteria to maximize sum benefits to EUs and ensure an envy-free energy trading market. A benefit function is designed that leverages generation of discriminate pricing by each EU, according to the amount of surplus energy that an EU trades with the SFC and the EU's sensitivity to price. It is shown that the game possesses a socially optimal, and hence also Pareto optimal, solution. Further, an algorithm that can be implemented by each EU in a distributed manner to reach the optimal solution is proposed. Numerical case studies are given that demonstrate beneficial properties of the scheme.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据