期刊
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
卷 123, 期 3, 页码 536-557出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.12.005
关键词
Corporate governance; Board composition; Innovation; Exploration and exploitation
资金
- Flemish Science Foundation
- NSF [1360228]
- Coleman Fung Institute for Engineering Leadership
- Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie
- SBE Off Of Multidisciplinary Activities [1536022] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
- Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie
- SBE Off Of Multidisciplinary Activities [1360228] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
Much research has suggested that independent boards of directors are more effective in reducing agency costs and improving firm governance. How they influence innovation is less clear. Relying on regulatory changes, we show that firms that transition to independent boards focus on more crowded and familiar areas of technology. They patent and claim more and receive more total future citations to their patents. However, the citation increase comes mainly from incremental patents in the middle of the citation distribution; the numbers of uncited and highly cited patents arguably associated with riskier innovation strategies do not change significantly. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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