Chaotic evolution of prisoner's dilemma game with volunteering on interdependent networks

In this article, the evolution of prisoner's dilemma game with volunteering on interdependent networks is investigated. Different from the traditional two-strategy game, voluntary participation as an additional strategy is involved in repeated game, that can introduce more complex evolutionary dynamics. And, interdependent networks provide a more generalized network architecture to study the intricate variability of dynamics. We have showed that voluntary participation could effectively promote the density of co-operation, that is also greatly affected by interdependent strength between two coupled networks. We further discussed the influence of interdependent strength on the densities of different strategies and found that an intermediate interdependence would play a bigger role on the evolution of dynamics. Subsequently, the critical values of the defection temptation for phase transitions under different conditions have been studied. Moreover, the global oscillations induced by the circle of dominance of three strategies on interdependent networks have been quantitatively investigated. Counter-intuitively, the oscillations of strategy densities are not periodic or stochastic, but have rich dynamical behaviors. By means of various analysis tools, we have demonstrated the global oscillations of strategy densities possessed chaotic characteristics. (c) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.