期刊
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
卷 125, 期 1, 页码 99-139出版社
UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
DOI: 10.1086/689773
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资金
- National Science Foundation [SES-0720943, 0962492]
- Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie [0962492] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
- Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences [0962492] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
Each year approximately 10 million high school seniors in China compete for 6 million seats through a centralized college admissions system. Within the last decade, many provinces have transitioned from a sequential to a parallel mechanism to make their admissions decisions. In this study, we characterize a parametric family of application-rejection assignment mechanisms, including the sequential, deferred acceptance, and parallel mechanisms in a nested framework. We show that all of the provinces that have abandoned the sequential mechanism have moved toward less manipulable and more stable mechanisms. We also show that existing empirical evidence is consistent with our theoretical predictions.
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