4.2 Article

Incentives for Lawyers: Moving Away from Eat What You Kill

期刊

ILR REVIEW
卷 70, 期 2, 页码 336-358

出版社

SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC
DOI: 10.1177/0019793916650450

关键词

compensation; pay incentives; empirical analysis; economics; fixed-effects models

向作者/读者索取更多资源

The authors study an international law firm that changed its compensation plan for team leaders to address a multitasking problem: Team leaders were focusing their effort on billable hours and not spending sufficient time on leadership activities to build the firm. Compensation was changed to provide greater incentives for the leadership activities and weaker incentives for billable hours. The effect of this change on the task allocation of the firm's team leaders was large and robust; team leaders increased their non-billable hours and shifted billable hours to team members. The firm's new compensation plan (combining an objective formula with subjective evaluations) is the fastest-growing compensation system among law firms today.

作者

我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.2
评分不足

次要评分

新颖性
-
重要性
-
科学严谨性
-
评价这篇论文

推荐

暂无数据
暂无数据