期刊
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
卷 99, 期 1, 页码 105-118出版社
MIT PRESS
DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00563
关键词
-
资金
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research
- Handelsbanken's Research Foundations
- National Program for Support of Top-Notch Young Professionals
This paper investigates how collusion between regulators and firms affects workplace safety using the case of China's coal mine deaths. We argue that decentralization makes collusion more likely and that its effect is strengthened if the transaction costs of collusion are lower. These hypotheses are tested by investigating the impact of decentralization contingent on regulators' characteristics. Exploring both decentralization and centralization reforms in the coal mine industry, we find that decentralization is correlated with an increase in coal mine death rates. Moreover, this increase in mortality is larger for the regulators with lower transaction costs (proxied by the locality of origin).
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据