期刊
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
卷 67, 期 -, 页码 65-74出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2016.10.003
关键词
Trust game; Investment game; Punishment; Reward; Reinforcement
类别
The literature suggests that in the trust game setting a third party may have an impact on trust and trustworthiness. This may be done through monitoring alone, as well as through punishment or reward. We examine the impact of these three factors in both fixed and random partner settings. We find evidence that third party intervention is sensitive to participant actions and can result in changes in investment and return behavior, although not necessarily in the intended direction. Despite this individual impact, adding punishment or reward capabilities to the third party monitor has no significant effect in the aggregate. The increase in contributions in the presence of a third party can primarily be attributed to third party monitoring. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据