期刊
ECONOMETRICA
卷 85, 期 2, 页码 675-689出版社
WILEY
DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13533
关键词
Private transfers; altruism; social networks; neutrality; inequality
类别
资金
- Investissements d'Avenir [A*MIDEX/ANR-11-IDEX-0001-02, ANR-11-IDEX-0003/Labex Ecodec/ANR-11-LABX-0047]
- European Research Council [616442]
- European Research Council (ERC) [616442] Funding Source: European Research Council (ERC)
We provide the first analysis of altruism in networks. Agents are embedded in a fixed network and care about the well-being of their network neighbors. Depending on incomes, they may provide financial support to their poorer friends. We study the Nash equilibria of the resulting game of transfers. We show that equilibria maximize a concave potential function. We establish existence, uniqueness of equilibrium consumption, and generic uniqueness of equilibrium transfers. We characterize the geometry of the network of transfers and highlight the key role played by transfer intermediaries. We then study comparative statics. A positive income shock to an individual benefits all. For small changes in incomes, agents in a component of the network of transfers act as if they were organized in an income-pooling community. A decrease in income inequality or expansion of the altruism network may increase consumption inequality.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据