期刊
ECONOMICS LETTERS
卷 157, 期 -, 页码 41-44出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.022
关键词
Punishment; Public good; Experiment; Selfish
类别
资金
- Max Planck Society
- IMPRS Uncertainty
We show that a second-party punisher forces his peers to contribute to a public good while contributing significantly less himself. This effect increased over time and casts doubt on the prevalent prosocial interpretation of (designated) punishment behavior. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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