Ties to Unbind: Political Ties and Firm Sell-Offs During Institutional Transition

We examine how formal interlocking political ties between business leaders and political actors affect sell-off strategy of firms in emerging markets. We propose that political ties substitute for underdeveloped institutions and provide firms with market intermediation, influence over political actors, and access to resources. These benefits increase the likelihood that firms with political ties will exit through sell-offs, which is an adaptation strategy in emerging markets. We propose that the effectiveness of political ties in facilitating sell-offs is contingent on the type of political ties and the state of institutional development. Empirically, we evaluate 280 television manufacturers in China between 1993 and 2003. Results show that political ties can help firms exit through sell-offs but that these effects are primarily from ties to actors with executive authority rather than legislative authority. The value of executive ties declines with capital market development, while that of legislative ties increases with legal system development. We show that political ties help firms exit an industry, clarify the conditions under which they are valuable during institutional transition, and improve understanding of the seller's perspective in acquisitions.