期刊
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES
卷 21, 期 12, 页码 940-949出版社
CELL PRESS
DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2017.09.009
关键词
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资金
- Programme of Excellence Grant from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) [433-09-243]
- Advanced Grant of the European Research Council [ERC-2015-AdG-694722]
From its academic beginnings the theory of human action control has distinguished between endogenously driven, intentional action and exogenously driven, habitual, or automatic action. We challenge this dual-route model and argue that attempts to provide clear-cut and straightforward criteria to distinguish between intentional and automatic action have systematically failed. Specifically, we show that there is no evidence for intention-independent action, and that attempts to use the criterion of reward sensitivity and rationality to differentiate between intentional and automatic action are conceptually unsound. As a more parsimonious, and more feasible, alternative we suggest a unitary approach to action control, according to which actions are (i) represented by codes of their perceptual effects, (ii) selected by matching intention-sensitive selection criteria, and (ii) moderated by metacontrol states.
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