期刊
DIALOGUE-CANADIAN PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW
卷 56, 期 3, 页码 503-526出版社
CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1017/S0012217317000440
关键词
HOT theory; consciousness; seemings; awareness; thought
类别
According to David Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious just in case one is aware of being in that state via a suitable HOT. Jesse Mulder (2016) recently objects: though HOT theory holds that conscious states are states that it seems to one that one is in, the view seems unable to explain how HOTs engender such seemings. I clarify here how HOT theory can adequately explain the relevant mental appearances, illustrating the explanatory power of HOT theory.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据