4.0 Article

Autocratic strategies for alternating games

期刊

THEORETICAL POPULATION BIOLOGY
卷 113, 期 -, 页码 13-22

出版社

ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2016.09.004

关键词

Cooperation; Extortion; Game theory; Zero-determinant strategy

资金

  1. Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) [RGPIN-2015-05795]

向作者/读者索取更多资源

Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally enforce linear constraints on payoffs. Here, we extend this theory of zero-determinant (or, more generally, autocratic) strategies to alternating games, which are often biologically more relevant than traditional synchronous games. Alternating games naturally result in asymmetries between players because the first move matters or because players might not move with equal probabilities. In a strictly-alternating game with two players, X and Y, we give conditions for the existence of autocratic strategies for playerX when (i)X moves first and (ii) Y moves first. Furthermore, we show that autocratic strategies exist even for (iii) games with randomly-alternating moves. Particularly important categories of autocratic strategies are extortionate and generous strategies, which enforce unfavorable and favorable outcomes for the opponent, respectively. We illustrate these strategies using the continuous Donation Game, in which a player pays a cost to provide a benefit to the opponent according to a continuous cooperative investment level. Asymmetries due to alternating moves could easily arise from dominance hierarchies, and we show that they can endow subordinate players with more autocratic strategies than dominant players. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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