期刊
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY
卷 25, 期 3, 页码 287-306出版社
ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1249013
关键词
Banking reforms; Basel III; business power; CRR-CRDIV; financial crisis; lobbying; political influence
This article argues that not all business politics is quiet politics' and it explores the conditions of when this is likely to be the case. Drawing on a remarkable lobbying success in the process of reforming banking in Europe, it shows that it was neither capture nor quiet politics within the financial expert community that led to the lobbying success. Business lobbyists from Germany, supported by representatives from other countries, obtained a favourable regulatory treatment of bank lending to small and medium-sized businesses thanks to noisy business politics. Noisy business politics seeks political influence through pressuring by raising the salience of an issue and expanding the conflict. This strategy is most likely to succeed if the mobilization of opponents can be countervailed through the use of frames that are widely perceived as legitimate and create positive perceptions.
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