期刊
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
卷 13, 期 1, 页码 87-113出版社
ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY
DOI: 10.3982/TE2627
关键词
High frequency repeated games; costly monitoring; Nash equilibrium; public perfect equilibrium; no folk theorem; characterization
类别
资金
- Google Inter-University Center for Electronic Markets and Auctions
- Israel Science Foundation [963/15, 212/09, 323/13]
We study two-player discounted repeated games in which one player cannot monitor the other unless he pays a fixed amount. It is well known that in such a model the folk theorem holds when the monitoring cost is on the order of magnitude of the stage payoff. We analyze high frequency games in which the monitoring cost is small but still significantly higher than the stage payoff. We characterize the limit set of public perfect equilibrium payoffs as the monitoring cost tends to 0. It turns out that this set is typically a strict subset of the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. In particular, there might be efficient and individually rational payoffs that cannot be sustained in equilibrium. We also make an interesting connection between games with costly monitoring and games played between long-lived and short-lived players. Finally, we show that the limit set of public perfect equilibrium payoffs coincides with the limit set of Nash equilibrium payoffs. This implies that our characterization applies also to sequential equilibria.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据