期刊
NEUROSCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
卷 4, 期 1, 页码 -出版社
OXFORD UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1093/nc/niy003
关键词
perception; contents of consciousness; theories and models; psychophysics
资金
- Methusalem grant from the Flemish government [METH/14/02]
A recently proposed model of sensory processing suggests that perceptual experience is updated in discrete steps. We show that the data advanced to support discrete perception are in fact compatible with a continuous account of perception. Physiological and psychophysical constraints, moreover, as well as our awake-primate imaging data, imply that human neuronal networks cannot support discrete updates of perceptual content at the maximal update rates consistent with phenomenology. A more comprehensive approach to understanding the physiology of perception (and experience at large) is therefore called for, and we briefly outline our take on the problem.
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