4.5 Article

Does central supervision enhance local environmental enforcement? Quasi-experimental evidence from China

期刊

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
卷 164, 期 -, 页码 70-90

出版社

ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.05.009

关键词

Environmental federalism; Central supervision; Water pollution; Regression discontinuity design; China

资金

  1. National Science Foundation of China [71433007]

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This paper draws on a natural experiment generated by the National Specially Monitored Firms (NSMF) program in China to evaluate the effectiveness of central supervision at improving local environmental enforcement. We explore a unique firm-level Chinese Environmental Statistics dataset and utilize a regression discontinuity design to assess the impact of central supervision through the NSMF program on an industrial firm's chemical oxygen demand (COD) emissions. The results suggest that central supervision significantly reduces industrial COD emissions by at least 26.8%. These results highlight the substantial room for improvement in Chinese environmental regulations via central supervision. A more flexible environmental decentralization regime and comprehensive central supervision are thus recommended for future reforms. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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