期刊
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
卷 165, 期 -, 页码 201-216出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.07.011
关键词
Political selection; Corruption; Competence; Local election; Political parties
类别
资金
- Swiss National Science Foundation [15860, 167635/177718]
- MIUR under the PRIN [2015TPM9]
- Recercaixa project [2016ACUP 00177]
We observe that popularity shocks are crucial for electoral accountability beyond their effects on voters' behaviors. By focusing on Brazilian politics, we show that the disclosure of audit reports on the (mis)use of federal funds by local administrators affects the type of candidates who stand for election. When the audit finds low levels of corruption, the parties supporting the incumbent select less-educated candidates. On the contrary, parties pick more-educated candidates when the audit reveals a high level of corruption. These effects are stronger in municipalities that have easier access to local media. (C) 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据