STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND OPTIMAL STRATEGIES IN AN M/G/1 QUEUE WITH BERNOULLI VACATIONS

This paper considers an unobservable M/G/1 queue with Bernoulli vacations in which the server begins a vacation when the system is empty or upon completing a service. In the latter case, the server takes a vacation with p or serves the next customer, if any, with 1 - p. We first give the steady-state equations and some performance measures, and then study the customer strategic behavior and obtain customers' Nash equilibrium strategies. From the viewpoint of the social planner, we derive the socially optimal joining probability, the socially optimal vacation probability and the socially optimal vacation rate. The socially optimal joining probability is found not greater than the equilibrium probability. In addition, if the vacation scheme does not incur any cost, the socially optimal decision is that the server does not take either a Bernoulli vacation or the normal vacation. On the other hand, if the server incurs the costs due to the underlying loss and the technology upgrade, proper vacations are beneficial to the social welfare maximization. Finally, sensitivity analysis is also performed to explore the effect of different parameters, and some managerial insights are provided for the social planner.